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Introduction
D uring the last few decades, the social-cultural and intellectual context, ledsocial and human scienc to the revision of its foundational philosophical
and scientific traditional assumptions. Two of the nlain features of this global
movement are a “linguistic turn” and an emphasis on relational constitution of
meanings. It is now underlined that to be human, in some sense, is to share
polysemic and multiple meanings, grounded in some particular context. Con
sequently, relation and communication are becoming theoretical objects, and
explanatory frameworks in its own right across this intellectual background
(Mendes, 2001).
As a participant in this context, psychology arrived at the critique of the
solipsistic Cartesian I, and many authors from different theoretical back
grounds assume that psychological space and processes have a relational basis.
Therefore, notions like relationship (e.g., Gergen, 1994), intersubjectivity (e.g.,
Coelho, Jr. & Figueiredo, 2003) and multiplicity (e.g., Hermans, 2004), for
instance, became appealing and quite widespread in psychological literature
over the last decades. Nowadays, there seems to be a large agreement that they
represent fruitful and invaluable formulas for the understanding of human
psychological phenomena, which may involve significant changes on the foun
dations of psychological science. However, like every comprehensive concept
in psychology, concepts such as relationship or dialogism may also be mislead
ing because of their polysemic nature. This ambiguity has not passed unnoticed
to Ivana Marková (2003a) who argues that those different conceptions of
relationship, intersubjectivity and communication are rooted in different onto
logical conceptions underlying each theoretical position.
Following this reasoning, it is an open possibility that some relational con
ceptions of the self may not be completely dialogical. What is becoming clear to
some authors (e.g., Marková, 2003b) is that a dialogical ontology (and, there
fore, the abandonment of traditional oatometaphysical and foundational fra
meworks) will be needed in order to address subjectivity from a relational
perspective. In other words, it can be said that a dialogical framework allows
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psychology to move beyond present dualism between realism and social con
structionism since it reconciles a conception of a subjective world in each
person, while maintaining the relational basis of the psychological realm (Sal
gado & Ferreira, 2004).
The IDialogical Self Framework
Hubert Hermans was one of the first authors to understand this intellectual
zeitgeisr, and his foundational contribution on the dialogical self theory opened
the space for different kinds of questions and answers on self structure and
functioning. At that time, though not addressing ontological issues, Hermans
(Hermans & Kempen, 1993; Hermans, Kempen & van Loon, 1992) relied on
Bakhtin’s framework for dialogicality, integrating it with Sarbin’s narrative
reformulation of William James’s thought. Following his proposals, self can
finally be conceived as a social and relational process.
The dialogical self theory opens and decentres the solipsistic Cartesian 1:
the human is now built as a dramaturgical space where different characters
move, dialogue and establish differential relations between them. Identity is
now considered as an intrinsically social movement of positioning and reposi
tioning of the Tin face of actual or potential audiences in very dynamic pro
cesses. This not only creates space for contradiction; more than that, opposition
and contradiction may be the basis for selfhood dynamics. Metaphorically, the
individual appears as D. Quixote, as someone who has the authorial responsi
bility of constantly reviewing his life project within the landscape of multipli
city, uncertainty and even fantasy.
All these proposals are strongly based on Bakhtin’s work (e.g., 1981, 1984),
creating a strong framework for the understanding of a relationally constituted
self. Within it, dialogical self became indexed to notions like voices, I-positions,
audience, multiplicity or dialogical relations (all concepts derived from Bakhtin),
which are being used as metaphorical tools in the elaboration of a new context for
reflection over human psychological phenomena. In this context, several concep
tions, formulations and methods of mapping such a multiplicity have emerged
from different lines of thought and so we can perceive differences more or less
noticed in the literature included in the dialogical framework (Salgado, 2004).
As a consequence, the clarification of these different approaches is a rele
vant necessity for the future of the field, since it struggles at this time with the
polysemic and ambiguous nature of those notions. Also, there are several
fundamental questions that have not yet been directly and clearly addressed:
for example, questions like “what is a dialogical relation?”, or “what is
a voice?” or “what is an audience?” remain unanswered. We will try to con
tribute with some clarification on these matters.
• Multiple Voices about Multiple Voices: Monological and Dialogical
Concepts of Voice
The concept of dialogical self has been used by multiple authors and in
vestigators who give a common emphasis to the notion of voice as a metaphor.
Since there is a multiplicity of voices talking about voices, we are interested in
• the meanings that have been assigned to this metaphor. For example, Stiles
(1997) argues that voice is somehow equivalent to the concepts of automatic
thoughts, reciprocal roles, or internal objects. This bridge between different
streams of thought is interesting, but at the same time it can create a sense of
dispersion. And so, it is important to ask, what are we talking about when we
talk about voices? Are all of them “dialogical voices”?
We can identify two different frameworks in which several authors position
themselves regarding multiplicity of the self: the monological and the dialogical
perspectives. In our view, a dialogical perspective df voice is quite dependent
on the notion of a relationship between an 1-position and a specific audience.
For instance, the concept of voice introduced by Hermans (Hermans & Kern-
pen, 1993; Hermans, Kempen & Hermans, 1996) is always associated to an 1-
position that establishes a dialogical articulation with different I-positions. In
other words, voice is considered the tool by which 1-positions entertain dialo
gical articulation: “The I has the capacity to imaginatively endow each position
with a voice so that dialogical relations between positions can be established.
The voices function like interacting characters in a story” (Hermans, Kempen
& van Loon, 1992, p. 28).
Some of the main advocates of a dialogical perspective follow this reason
ing (e.g., Holquist, 1990; Marková, 2003b). For them, “voice” is the element
that relates a centre (I) and a periphery (the Others), while expressing and
referring to different objects of the world. Therefore, “voice” seems a volatiLe
experience, something that happens, by which the person specifies her/his
experience of relating with. We can only know a person by “hearing” his or
her voice, which reveals the specific positioning of that person. In conclusion, in
dialogical terms, the key element seems to be the notion of positioning, and not
so much the notion of voice.
However, not all the authors and researchers share this dialogical perspec
tive while talking about voices. Some do not take into account the notion of
audience and consequently of positioning (e.g., Elliot & Greenberg, 1997;
Fonagy, 1997), while others do (e.g., Hermans, Kempen & vanLoon, 1992;
Leiman, 2002). The difference between these perspectives is that the dialogical
perspective demands the existence of a peripheral and simultaneous audience
as the receptor of a voiced message from a central I-position. The monological
reference frame does not take into account in a substantive way the mediating
function of that notion of voice in psychological processes. In other words,
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these approaches talk about multiple voices without acknowledging the other-
ness quality and addressivity of human experience.
Levels of analysis on the dialogical self
Following Bakhtin and the dialogical self theory, every utterance has an
addressee. It is always addressed to an explicit or implicit audience, which
restricts and orients the content of the utterance. On this approach, subjectivity
has been implicitly described as a process based on a basic dyadic structure,
constituted by two simultaneous elements in relation. In our view, this dyadic
scheme generally formats dialogical self models. Nevertheless, we find differ
ences in levels and units of analysis chosen by authors, which lead them to
different kinds of approaches. This is a topic that has not been clearly ad
dressed, but it seems a sensitive one. Our argument is that it is possible to
differentiate distinct levels of analysis with increasing complexity.
An elemental level of analysis (see Figure 1) relates a given I-position to its
audience, implied in the notions of positioning and addressivity. The main idea of
a dialogical self, in fact, is this exchange of utterances or signs, which defines the
most fundamental and relational quality of human life. This level is the most basic
and important one, since it necessarily implies the presence of an audience. As
Bakhtin recognised, even in a single utterance, the other is always present, creat
ing an “hidden dialogicality”: “The second speaker is invisibly present, his words
are not there, but the deep traces left by these words have a determining influence
on all the present and visible words of the first speaker” (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 197).
Figure 1. First level of analysis on the dialogical self
Probably, one of the major challenges for the dialogical self theory is pre
cisely the study of this audience. Most authors refer to this constitutive addres
sivity when talking about dialogical seLf (e.g., Georgaca, 2001; Hermans, Kem
pen & vanLoon, 1992; Raggatt, 2000; Shotter, 1993; Wortham, 2001). How
ever, it seems that in literature it is usually hard to find a clear reference and
explanation of what this audience is.
Probably Leiman (2002; see also Leiman, 1992) has presented the most
elaborated reflections on these matters. In his words:
1...) a person’s position reveals his or hers subjective stance with regard to the
addressee. The addressee, be it another person, a referential object of utterance
or an ‘invisible third’, is always seen to adopt a reciprocal stance — a reciprocal
position. Thus, instead of a dialogue between an i-position (a voice) and another,
each i-position has dialogical relationships to its addressee(s). Obviously, another
aspect of self (another i-position) can be the addressee, but this is only a specific
instance of the more general idea that all our mental activities are addressed (Lei
man, 2002, p. 232).
However, his answer is not yet completely satisfactory. Methodologically,
Leiman (1997; Leiman & Stiles, 2001) associates a self-state with a “dialogical
pattern” of position and reciprocal position, which are conceived as pairs of
logical opposites such as blaming / guilty or demanding / striving. Noticeably,
the question of audience remains unsolved. From a dialogical point of view, it is
not possible to reduce dialogicality to logical oppositions (Hermans & Kempen,
1993). We cannot see any particular reason to assume that “another person”,
a “referential object”, or an “invisible third” must be reciprocal opposites.
Nevertheless, Leiman brings to the foreground one of the most important
issues in dialogical self framework: the relation as the constitutive basis for
subjectivity. Following the dialogical assumption that relation is logically and
ontologically prior, an ontology of processes is implied instead of the traditional
ontology of substances. In other words, given the dialogical principle, an 1-posi
tion does not exist outside the relation with a specific audience. With this in mind
we are led to the conclusion that the audience should indeed, as Leiman seems to
argue, be conceptualized as part of the intemal structure of an I-position.
Figure 2. Second level of analysis of the dialogical relations in the self
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In literature, it seems to be widely accepted that an audience can be an
other 1-position, which leads us to a second level of analysis (see Figure 2).
Maintaining himself close to a bakhtinian analysis of Dostoevsky’s literary
work, 1-lermans (2004) emphasizes the multiplicity of I-positions and their role
as anchor points in the organization of a configuration of the multiple self at
a given point in time. Following this, Flermans (2004) proposes that selfhood is
defined by juxtaposition and dynamics of I-positions in an imaginal landscape.
In that sense, selfhood is described as an interplay between I-positions. As an
example, we can cite the case described by Hermans and Hermans-Jansen
(1995) of “Mary and the Witch” where two 1-positions address each other in
an opposing and conflicting way. In fact, there is a tendency to think about
personal problems as conflicts between two 1-positions. This is also present in
(he voice formulation of Stiles’ (Honos-Webb & Stiles, 1998) assimilation
model.
Again, what seems to be lacking in this second level is the prior dialogical
dynamics constitutive of each I-position. As can be seen in the following quota-
(ion, it seems that the origin of I-positions remains the individual instead of the
dialogical dynamics: “l-termans and Kempen (1993) amplified the notion of
voices by suggesting that the self is essentially dialogical, meaning that voices
within the self relate to each other through dialogue” (Honos-Webb & Stiles,
1998, p. 23). In this formulation, the basic relational features of dialogicality are
not completely acknowledged. Ontologically and developmentally, before ad
dressing other 1-positions, a person addresses real others. Thus, each 1-position
is embedded in a historical relationship with others. The diversity of this kind of
experiences with others creates a differentiation within the self — a multiplicity
of I-positions — each one with its specific audiences. These different 1-positions
may entertain dialogical relationships between them. Nevertheless, dialogical
relationships between I-positions do not exhaust dialogical relationships within
the self. To fully recognize that we need to take into account (he actual or
potential audiences of each I-position.
At this point, we can clearly recognize the difficulty of surpassing the
traditional assumption of the original nature of consciousness intentionality,
in order to create a complete model based on the assumption of the constitutive
character of radical and insoluble asymmetry between an I and an Other.
Hermans (2004) recognizes this need in stating: “the other person, or another
‘object~ are not simply known as objectified realities or internalized objects, but
can only be known as far as they are allowed to speak from their own perspec
tives” (p. 21).
It is precisely the otherness qualities of the “other-in-the-self’ which make
it possible for the I and the Other to acquire psychological existence. But how
can the Other not be me in my self? In fact, this is perhaps the most difficult and
puzzling question in the dialogical self theory. The answer seems to lie once
again in a more dialogical adequate elaboration of the presence and participa
tion of the audience in psychological space and time.
Finally we have a third level of analysis (see Figure 3).
Figure 3. Third level of analysis on the dialogical self
The last level is present whenever researchers refer tq concrete dialogues
between two people. In an intersubjective experience of this kind, the dynamic
is even more complex, since this “real Other”, the interlocutor, works probably
as a different kind of audience, while other internal audiences are being ad
dressed. For example, if someone looks outside the window and says to an
interlocutor “It seems that it will rain today”, the person is addressing not only
the other, but also an internal audience with specific plans, purposes, affects,
and so on. At the same time, there is mutual coordination between these two
people, probably trying to get a mutual understanding of the situation. Conse
quently, at this level what is at hands is the intersubjective and mutual con
struction of meaning.
Leiman and Stiles (2001) bring forward, by means of “Dialogical Sequence
Analysis”, how joint communication between client and therapist may intro
duce signs that work as developmental tools if placed in the zone of proximal
development built in client I therapist intersubjective movements. Accordingly,
the clients may reorganize the relationship between conflicting I-positions to
wards an integration of those differences.
Wortham (2001) makes use of a similar framework, where the relational
and narrative dimension of the self is highlighted. In his proposal, self is, at
least, partially conceived as a performative and social act of relating with some
one else. So, whenever someone starts to tell a self-narrative to someone else,







128 Tiago Ferreira, JoSo Salgado, Carla Cunha. Liliana tvte,ra, and Agnieszka Konopka Talking about Voices: A Critical Reflection about Levels of Analysis on the Dialogical Self 129
Nevertheless, even in this last and more comprehensive level, it is possible
to detect some conceptual difficulties. As an example, we have the usual con
fusion between “dialogue” and “dialogicality”. Two people talking and inter
acting are in a process of “dialogue”; nevertheless, it is possible to describe and
analyse a dialogue in a monological way. Sometimes, some researchers do not
take into account this distinction, thus merging both notions. In our view, this
distinction is a necessary step, towards clarifying this domain.
Keeping the dialogicality of the dialogical self
As we saw the contemporary intellectual context in social and human
sciences moves psychology to search for a relational account of subjectivity.
Although not extensively elaborated we argued that a dialogical ontology is the
suitable framework for this undertaking. However, at present time, dialogical
self and the metaphor of voice may become umbrella-like concepts (Valsiner,
2000), which aggregate underneath themselves several formulations that do not
share the dialogical assumptions, and do not create the innovation previously
foreseen. Simultaneously, even in dialogical oriented accounts of the self, basic
notions of I-position and audience, for instance, remain polysemic as different
levels and units of analysis coexist. Furthermore, in its current state of devel
opment, dialogical formulations seem unable to give a fully dialogical account
of self structure and functioning. As an example of this, which we tried to
highlight in this work, is the role of audience that seems neglected and under
developed in relevant literature. An important consequence of this is the re
entrance of Cartesian elements in dialogical conceptions.
Concluding, it is important to underline that dialogical self theory some
times maintains subsumed individual consciousness as necessary and assumes
that, because in a communicational act two people are involved, relational
subjective structures are also dyadic. However, as some authors (e.g., Jacques,
1991; Marcos, 2001) in philosophy and communicational studies argued, in
a dialogical framework the departing point should be a communicational
one, relating communicational agencies and not egos, people or consciousness.
From this point on, these authors arrive at the assumption that, although the
communicational act has a dyadic structure, the internal communicational
structure is triadic: the I as a communicational agency “really occupies the
threefold position of representing the one who speaks, the one who is spoken,
and the one who is spoken to” (Jacques, 1991, p. 12). Therefore, it is possible to
change current conceptions on dialogical self by assuming that the subjective
space simultaneously include the I as centre of experience, the “other-in-the
self”, and internal audiences, thus surpassing some of the problems pointed
previously in this paper.
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MARIANE L. DESOUZA AND WILLIAM B. GOMES8 F—
Temporality and Spatiality in Dialogue
T he concepts of semiotics and dialogue have brought new empirical andanalyti tools to study the relations betw en functi nal and com un tional
aspects of self. Both concepts work with sign— that is, the conversational or dia
logical perception of meaning and the functionality or pragmatics of expression.
However, different assumptions concerning temporality and spatiality underlie
both semiotic and dialogical perspectives of self. The dialogical self theoretical
framework (Hermans, 2001a, 2001b, 2003; Hermans & Kempen, 1993) noted the
importance of spatiality in dialogue, whereas the semiotic self theoretical frame
work (Pickering, 1999, and particularly, Wiley, 1994) focused on temporality.
In order to provide an alternative view that encompasses both of these
theories and establish the necessity of differentiating between self and identity,
this chapter will describe different positions or voices in dialogue. The chapter
is divided into two parts. Part one is an eidetic discussion defining and analyz
ing the concepts of dialogical self and semiotic self. Part two is a description of
empirical evidence obtained by two different instruments, the Inner Speech
Method — ISM (Berteau, 1999) and the Personal Position Repertoire — PPR
(Hermans, 2001b) to support these concepts. The conceptual discussion estab
lishes the ontological relevance of defining the implications of time and space
for a basic and general understanding of self as both a working process and
identity. The empirical evidence supports this new account of the self, differ
entiating it, respectively, as working process and identity.
Part One: Concepts and Definitions
Dialogical and Semiotic Perspectives of Self
The dialogical and the semiotic perspectives agree concerning the assump
tion of the self as a sign. The semiotic perspective states that human selfhood is
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